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ABSTRACT
This is an exploratory study of effects of municipal accounting
practices on capital asset acquisition decisions. Theoretical decision
models are developed for using expenditure and depreciation accounting.
The models suggest expenditure accounting may lead to inefficient
acquisitions in the long-run. Leases in three cities are subjected
to present value analysis and compared to purchase alternatives. In
these three cases, lease analysis supports the theoretical models.
They suggest that departments using expenditure accounting will
acquire assets with uneconomic leases and that these leases will be
more uneconomic than leases of departments using depreciation accounting

The cost of government is a fopic of considerable concern today. While
different parties may disagree on the appropriate level of government
spending, most will agree on the need for efficiency in spending. For this
reason, the effect of an accounting and reporting model on governmental
financial efficiency should be of concern to accounting standard-setters
and to the constituents of government.
This is an exploratory study of the effects of alternative municipal
accounting practices on capital asset acquisition decisions. It begins
with the development of a theoretical model of asset acquisition decision-
making in the municipal environment, based upon an analysis of the incen-
tives and constraints presented by current reporting practices. This model
suggests that reporting expenditures, as required for general government
activities by municipal generally accepted accounting principles (MGAAP)
,
will encourage acquisition decisions that will reduce annual expenditures.
These may include the use of operating leases, in spite of the fact that
they may be more expensive, or inefficient, in the long run, than purchases.
A contrasting theoretical model, in which expenses are reported, suggests
that more expensive, inefficient acquisitions will be discouraged by the
use of this alternative reporting method. While municipalities as a whole
do not report expenses, some of their activities (enterprise and internal
service funds) are required to use the commercial model for reporting pur-
poses. Thus, it is possible to compare the decisions resulting from the
use of the two reporting methods within a city.
After development of the theoretical models, a field study of the
leasing practices of departments in three cities was conducted to determine
whether actual practice appears to be consistent with the theoretical models
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in these cases. The lease contracts (both operating and financing leases)
for all departments of three cities were analyzed using present value tech-
niques and were compared to their purchase alternatives for long run effi-
ciency. Based upon the theoretical model and results of the examination
of case study data, hypotheses regarding the effects of government
accounting practices on departmental capital asset acquisitions are pro-
posed. The following hypotheses were suggested and are proposed for
further investigation:
HI: Municipal departments that use expenditure accounting will tend to
acquire assets for long-term use with leases that are uneconomic.
H2: Municipal departments that use depreciation expense accounting
will tend to acquire assets for long-terra use with leases that are
more economic than the leases negotiated by departments that use
expenditure accounting.
Theoretical Development
Municipal Accounting and Budgeting
Governmental funds, which are used to account for most municipal
government functions, use modified accrual accounting and incorporate the
budget into accounting. When an asset is purchased for long-terra service,
the total cost of the acquisition is recorded as a one-tirae expenditure of
the period, instead of depreciated. The expenditure accounts will usually
show both the total expended to date and the remaining budget appropria-
tion. In addition to its inclusion in the accounts, the annual operating
budget must also be included in the external reports of governmental funds
that are in compliance with MGAAP [MFOA, p. 18].
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Capital budgeting is emphasized much less than the annual operating
budget. The decision to use a capital budget for planning or to include
these documents in external reports is left to the individual municipali-
ties [MFOA, pp. 15-18]. Harry Hatry, director of the State and Local
Government Research Program at the Urban Institute, has noted:
Capital-budgeting analysis in state and local govern-
ments is rudimentary compared with the private sector.
There is seldom significant provision for such tech-
niques as "make or buy" analysis or "optimal equipment
replacement" analysis [Hatry, p. 273].
Enterprise funds account for activities that are operated and financed
in the same manner as private enterprises, e.g., utilities and airports.
Internal service funds provide goods or services internally, but charge
user departments on a cost-reimbursement basis. These "proprietary funds"
are required by MGAAP to use full accrual accounting and report net income
as business enterprises, using a capital maintenance focus [MFOA, pp. 10-
13]. Fixed assets are capitalized and charged against net income through
depreciation expense. In order to accentuate the difference between the
two approaches in accounting for asset acquisitions, the modified accrual
approach will be referred to as "expenditure accounting" while the full
accrual approach will be referred to as "depreciation accounting." General
government activities, then, will always use expenditure accounting, but
most cities will also have subunits of proprietary funds that use deprecia-
tion accounting.
Considerable controversy exists with regard to the use of expenditure
accounting for reporting the activities of governmental funds. Proponents
of MGAAP feel that reporting budgetary compliance is of primary importance:
[T]he objective of accounting for fund entities is not
to provide managerial information relative to costs and
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accoraplishments of programs. Rather, the objective is
to provide accounting control for the collection and
expenditure of selected funds and to insure that no
violations of legally authorized limits on expenditures
occur [American Accounting Association, p. 97].
Opponents of current MGAAP suggest other objectives:
The public has a right to know... the cost of present
programs and services provided by the governmental unit.
Proper depreciation accounting is necessary for this
purpose [Davidson, et_ a_l.
,
p. 46].
From a policymaking point of view, one means of resolving this conflict
would be to demonstrate a cost (or benefit) associated with the objective
chosen. The decision models discussed below suggest that the method of
reporting asset acquisition and use might be expected to affect the effi-
ciency of department administrators' financing decisions. The field study
then examines actual costs associated with those decisions in three munici-
palities.
Models of Decision-Making Behavior
Organizational behavior literature provides a theoretical framework for
the development of a model of municipal administrators' asset acquisition
decisions. Simon's [1976] theory of administrative decision-making charac-
terizes the administrator as solving a problem by choosing a course of
action from a limited set of alternatives that may be controlled, to some
degree, by the information provided by the organization. In this framework,
data generated by the accounting and budgeting system would be expected to
act as cues suggesting possible courses of action to the municipal admini-
strator.
Insert Figure 1 about here
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Figure 1 illustrates the asset acquisition process suggested by the
information produced by an accounting system designed to comply with MGAAP
for general government activities. The accounting system ordinarily pro-
vides two relevant cues (indicated in circles) to a municipal administrator
who wishes to acquire a package of assets:
1) the budgeted expenditure limits for that department, and
2) the total actual expenditures made by the department.
These cues focus attention on a comparison of actual to budgeted expendi-
tures. MGAAP provides no formal incentive to consider long-run costs. If
other factors are to be considered in acquiring asset services, they must
be suggested by information outside the formal MGAAP accounting system.
The apparent resulting behavior by the administrator is that, as long
as he/she can force total expenditures ($P+$L) under the budget limit ($B),
he/she will acquire the entire package of desired assets (A). Leasing
(short-term or long-term) is one way to accomplish this. There is no
apparent need to justify one acquisition method over another on any basis
other than budget compliance. This model will be referred to as the
"expenditure model."
Insert Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 introduces a decision cue not readily available to the general
government administrator that could modify the expected decision-making
behavior. This model might represent a business or proprietary admin-
istrator's asset acquisition decision framework. For comparative purposes,
let us assume that this administrator views his/her budget as inflexible.
In this model, the income statement reports the annual cost of using
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purchased assets (CP), or depreciation, as well as leased assets (CL)
instead of the total expenditures ($P+$L) presented in the earlier model.
The difference between the decision models in Figure 1 and Figure 2
is that the cost information reported in the financial statements may
trigger the decision process enclosed by dashed lines in Figure 2. An
asset purchase will result in annual depreciation reported over the life of
the asset just as lease expense will be reported each year. Two types of
considerations are suggested by this type of information:
1) Which alternative is least costly (e.g., has the lowest present
value or smallest dollar outlay) over the life of the asset?
2) Can the annual cost of an alternative be justified?
The first consideration is a capital budgeting decision. The financial
statements will not actually report the present values compared in the
models, but the long-terra nature of the accrual financial statements would
suggest that these values be computed in order that long-term comparisons
can be made. The second consideration is a direct evaluation of the annual
cost resulting from each choice. This model will be referred to as the
"depreciation model."
While asset acquisition decisions in this model are screened for cost
justification and efficiency, budget restrictions are also considered. A
decision to lease or purchase must satisfy both conditions relating to cost
and conditions relating to budget control. If the same package of assets
were considered using the models developed in each figure, the depreciation
model would probably reject some acquisitions accepted by the expenditure
model.
The expenditure model suggests that a governmental department head may
internalize the one-year time horizon of the operating budget, accepting
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a limited annual expenditure goal rather than a minimum long-term cost
goal, If the manager becomes a short-run optimizer, or a short-run satis-
ficer, the result could be waste of taxpayers' money in the long-run. The
depreciation model suggests that a municipal administrator of a proprietary
fund reporting expenses (depreciation) is more likely to consider long-run
costs and adopt a goal of minimizing long-terra costs.
Field Study Research Design
A field study of asset acquisition decisions in three municipalities
was employed to refine two hypotheses suggested by the theoretical models.
Because the models developed suggest expenditure accounting might encourage
various types of leasing to reduce annual expenditures, the focus of the
field study is on the short-terra and long-terra leases of the participating
municipalities and on the "costs" associated with those leases. In the
three cities studied, two major questions are addressed:
1) Do municipal departments using expenditure accounting acquire
assets for long-terra use with uneconomic leases?
2) Do municipal departments using depreciation accounting (governmen-
tal departments) engage in leases that are more economic than those
of municipal departments using expenditure accounting (proprietary
departments)?
In order to answer these two questions, the personal property leases
for all governmental and proprietary departments were subjected to present
value analysis and compared to purchase alternatives. Excess leasing costs
are evaluated in terras of their materiality to the departments and by com-
parison between types of departments. The method of analysis is discussed
in detail below.
Characteristics of Municipalities Studied
Several criteria were established for selection of the cities to be
studied. First, because the research questions are concerned with comparing
the effects of using expenditure accounting for governmental funds and
depreciation accounting for proprietary funds, it was necessary to study
cities that had both types of funds following these GAAP requirements.
Cities with fewer than two proprietary funds were not considered. The con-
tents of independent auditors reports were used to determine compliance,
and discussions with finance directors determined they were not employing
accounting procedures beyond GAAP requirements. City A has 29 departments,
seven of them proprietary; of City B's 12 departments, three are proprietary;
and City C has 17 departments, three of which are proprietary.
Each municipality in the study is located in a different state; one
in the southwest, one in the midwest and one in the southeast. They
were offered anonimity and are referred to as City A, City B, and City C.
The populations of these cities are between 90,000 and 350,000. Their
sizes were assumed to be large enough to assure acquisition of a signifi-
cant number of assets every year and small enough to facilitate thorough
analysis of all leasing activity by the researcher. None of these munici-
palities is at or near its debt limit, which might cause legal restrictions
in available acquisition alternatives.
Location and Examination of Leases
In all three cities, there was no central file of short and long terra
leases and no individual who could provide information on all leases.
Several audit techniques were used to identify and locate all personal
property lease contracts. All department administrators were asked to
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identify their leases. Purchasing directors were interviewed and their
lease files were examined for lease contracts. Finally, the financial
records were audited for charges to rental expenditures which were then
traced to lessors and contracts.
Department administrators and personnel were asked to explain the asset
use associated with each short-terra lease (some were raonth-to-month leases)
to identify those where long-terra use was anticipated. All leases of
assets for long-terra use were examined and analyzed as discussed in the
following section. Assets for whom expected use was temporary were ex-
cluded from the analysis.
Analysis of Lease Contracts
Lease/purchase evaluation models are primarily concerned with
separating the investment and financing components of the alternatives.
In the case of a municipal government, the analysis is rather uncomplicated
because of the absence of income tax effects on cash flows. Davidson et al,
[1978] developed a model for making lease/purchase comparisons, and a simi-
lar model, adapted to the governmental context, was used to compare the
present value of each lease to its purchase alternatives:
j L
t
e = E [ -^] - P
t-1 (1 + i)
C i
In this model, e represents the net present value of the additional cost
of a lease; L is the annual lease payment; P is the purchase price of the
asset at the beginning of the lease period; i is the municipality's borrow-
ing rate; and j is the life of the lease, set equal to the life of the
asset for operating leases. If e is positive, a lease is uneconomic. The
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materialicy of Che diseconomies may be evaluated by reference to other city
statistics, such as taxes and expenditures discussed in later sections.
In order to operationalize the model, the variables must be either
observable or capable of estimation. L, the annual lease payment, can be
directly observed by examination of the lease contract. P, the purchase
price, and i, the municipality's borrowing rate, represent hypothetical
cases; and the life of the asset, j, cannot be observed until the end of
its economic life. P, i, and j must, therefore, be estimated; the estima-
tion methods are discussed below.
Purchase Price
Estimates of the purchase price, P, of each asset were obtained through
correspondence with the lessors, except where lease contracts specified a
purchase price. In each case, a letter was sent to the lessor by the finance
director of the lessee city requesting that the purchase data be provided
to the researcher. Lessors were also asked to specify if any portion of the
lease payment was for maintenance, so this amount could be removed from L.
A purchase price provided by lessors is unlikely to reflect discounts
that might have been obtained through the negotiation process and, as such,
can be accepted as a conservative component in the lease analysis. If this
component introduces any bias into the analysis, it would be to understate e.
Discount Rate
The municipal bond rate is an appealing cost of capital measure because
bonds are the only type of noncancellable long-terra debt available to muni-
cipalities under most state laws. It has the additional research advantage
that, at some points in time, the rate is observable.
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One perceived drawback of using the municipal bondj rate for analysis
of equipment acquisitions is that the assets often have useful lives of
five-to-ten years while bond terras are generally twenty-to-thirty years.
This problem can be avoided when serial bonds are issued and bids for the
bonds are broken down into different effective rates for bonds of varying
maturities. In the three municipalities studied, all bonds issued were
serials, and the serials began maturing within two years of issuance.
Specific interest rates had been bid for each maturity and a composite rate
determined for the overall issue. Thus, at the time of issue it was pos-
sible to observe actual interest rates for periods approximating the life,
j, of practically any type of personal property.
The rate, i, required for the model is the appropriate rate at time
of acquisition, t. Since acquisitions seldom occur on the date of a bond
issue, a model was developed to adjust the most recent bond rate to an
approximation of the rate applicable at the acquisition date:
I
. m,p
J.P jfk I r,
m, K.
i. = the unknown interest rate for debt of terra i on the
J,P J
date of purchase p;
i. = the interest rate obtained by the municipality for
bonds of the terra j issued on date k, where k is the
last bond issuance date prior to p;
I = the average yield on equally rated bonds traded on
m,p &
date p for terra m;
I = the average yield on equally rated bonds of terra m
issued on date k.
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A data file of rates representing i. was constructed from approved
J > ^
bond bid sheets for each municipality from 1975 through 1981. This file
notes, for each bond issue, the actual rate bid and accepted for each
maturity period. Moody's Bond Record [p. 127] includes indices equivalent
to I and I , for municipal bonds.
ra,p ra,k
Asset Life
The asset life, j, had to be estimated for all leased assets. For
long-term leases in which title passed at the end of the lease period or
the payments obviously met or exceeded the purchase price, the terra of the
lease was assumed to be the life of the asset. For other leases, two
sources were consulted in order to obtain a reasonable, objective estimate
of asset life.
Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended in 1971, sets
forth the Class Life Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system as a guideline
for depreciating business assets. Section 167 establishes estimated useful
lives for specific classes of assets, by type of asset used in all business
activities (e.g., office furniture, fixtures and equipment; automobiles and
taxis). The ADR asset guidelines provided an objective estimate of j for
most of the leased assets in this study.
There is no ADR asset class for hospital assets, and City A's hospital
leased a significant amount of diagnostic and treatment equipment that is
unique to this type of activity. The American Hospital Association (AHA)
publishes a guide for member hospitals titled Estimated Useful Lives of
Depreciable Hospital Assets [1978] that includes a table of estimated use-
ful lives of individual items of major movable equipment [pp. 4-7], and
this was used to estimate j for hospital leased assets.
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Comparisons of Governmental and Proprietary Departments
In order to address the question of whether proprietary departments
using depreciation accounting negotiate more efficient leases than govern-
mental departments using expenditures accounting, the leasing activities in
the two types of funds must be compared. First, leases in all proprietary
departments were evaluated using the present value model explained above.
Interpretation of the differences between types of funds requires con-
sideration of several factors.
Mathematical comparisons can be made of total dollars of excess cost,
average value per lease of excess cost, and total excess cost as a percen-
tage of purchase price. Total dollar comparisons allow the outcome to be
driven, to some extent, by the greater number of departments and the
greater number of leases. Average value per lease and total excess cost as
percentage of purchase price, on the other hand, will permit a single
extremely uneconomic lease to overwhelm large numbers of uneconomic leases.
All may need to be considered in interpreting the lease analyses. The
implications of nonleasing departments must also be considered.
Finally, subjective factors may be very important in understanding the
underlying causes of the results. There may be factors unique to a depart-
ment or to a particular administrator that will explain activity that is
not consistent with the models. These could include funding restrictions
by third parties and specialized training and background of the department
head. Interviews with all department heads were used to identify Important
factors in the asset acquisition process and in background and training of
the individuals involved. Both types of information, objective and subjec-
tive, were considered in interpreting the results and in developing hypo-
theses for further testing.
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Resul ta
Lease Analysis for City A
Uneconomic Leases of Governmental Departments
Four of the 22 governmental departments in City A leased 244 assets
for long-terra use from outside suppliers. The present value of these per-
sonal property leases is $6,721,349, $3,060,264 more than the original
purchase price of these assets. The details of these statistics are sum-
marized in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 here
The materiality of the excess cost can be evaluated by comparing it to
other city-wide statistics. Total 1979-80 expenditures for the general
funds were $92,258,302. The excess cost of leasing in the governmental
departments is 3.3% of total expenditures. Comparing this cost with total
tax revenues ($47,627,716) and property tax revenues ($25,533,796) for the
same period, the excess cost of leasing is 6.4% and 12.0% of these amounts,
respectively.
Individual Departments
Table 1 also shows capital expenditures as a percent of total expen-
ditures for each governmental department. For departments where both lease
and purchase are negligible, the issue is irrelevant. Because City A
purchases vehicles and equipment through an internal service fund, a number
of departments, such as police and fire, fall into this category. Since
departments with a significant amount of capital outlay and no leasing
would appear to contradict the first model, those with capital outlay in
excess of 1% of expenditures (Table 1, last column) are discussed below.
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Capital expenditures in the finance, internal audit and research and
budget departments were 2.7%, 13.2% and 1.3%, respectively, of total expen-
ditures. But each of these departments is involved in accounting and/or
budgeting for all city departments, governmental and proprietary, and,
thus, could be exposed to both the long-terra or the short-term model.
Furthermore, the controller and the city auditor had previous public
accounting experience and training in commercial accounting, and the
research and budget department is developing a "life cycle costing" concept
to use for lease/purchase analysis in the future. These factors suggest
explanations for their lease avoidance.
Capital outlay expenditures were 3.2% of total expenditures for the
urban transportation department in 1979-80. The absence of leasing in this
department is probably related to grant restrictions. The transit division
relies heavily on federal and state funds, and the director explained that
the terras of these grants were such that capital items were financed 80% by
Federal funds and 13% by state funds. The City could, in essence, buy
assets for 7% of their cost. Leases, on the other hand, are "operating
costs" and grants covered no more than 50% of these costs. The result is
that, even in the short run, purchase was less expensive than lease.
Based upon this analysis of nonleasing governmental departments and
the leases existing in the remainder of departments, the expenditure model
appears to provide a reasonable explanation of the asset acquisition deci-
sions of governmental department administrators who have neither special
training in long-term cost evaluation nor grant restrictions with regard to
capital asset acquisition.
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Proprietary vs. Governmental Departments
Three of the seven proprietary departments using depreciation account-
ing in City A were leasing 100 assets for long-terra use. The present value
of these leases was $3,678,798 and the excess cost was $1,703,069. Table 2
presents asset acquisition information and expense data for all the
proprietary funds. In total dollars, the excess cost of leasing is much
greater for the governmental departments than for the proprietary depart-
ments in City A. But the average excess cost per lease was $17,030 and
the excess cost of leasing as a percent of purchase price was 86.2% for
proprietary departments, compared to $12,542 and 83.6% for governmental
departments. This measure does not seem to support the contention that
proprietary departments engage in more efficient leases. However, after
the individual departments are evaluated below, the two major leasing
proprietary departments appear to be "special cases" while the nonleasing
proprietary departments take on more significance as possible illustrations
of the expected decisions resulting from the depreciation model.
Insert Table 2 here
Individual Departments
The three leases of the electric utility are the most uneconomical of
the proprietary leases; the $14,647 excess cost is 190.83 percent of pur-
chase price. The materiality of the leases, however, is doubtful. Table 2
shows this department had both expenses and additions to fixed assets in
excess of $130,000,000. Furthermore, these leases were located by audit of
rent expense accounts; the department head indicated in his interview that
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this department does not lease equipment. This indicates that these leases
may not have been the result of the department head's decision.
The leases of the hospital are "more uneconomic" than the leases of any
governmental department and are significant both in terras of dollar size
($2,849,618) and compared to the expenses of that fund. The present value
of the leases is 7.7% of all 1979-80 expenses for the hospital and almost
as large as its additions to property, plant and equipment.
The hospital administrator indicated that technology is a major con-
sideration in leasing assets, and hospital equipment is probably more
susceptible to obsolescence than any other municipal assets. There were,
however, several hospital equipment leases for periods as long as the esti-
mated useful life, while ownership remained with the lessor, with implicit
interest rates exceeding 20%. There were also 19 typewriters leased month-
to-month.
An unusual feature of hospital operations may contribute to the propen-
sity to lease in this department. A large portion of the revenue earned by
a hospital is collected through third party reirabursers such as the Federal
Government, through the Medicare and Medicaid programs, and insurance com-
panies, and they establish guidelines for determining the reimbursable
costs that can be billed to patients. Costs of leasing can be passed on as
operating costs in the year of lease, but capital assets must be depre-
ciated using lives that are longer than the current AHA guidelines. Thus,
to the degree that these third parties are providing hospital revenues,
leasing costs are recoverable in the year of expenditure, while capital
expenditures are recovered over a period that may be longer than the useful
life. In this case, leasing could prove more economical than purchasing.
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The public information department, previously a governmental depart-
ment, had recently taken responsibility for all copy machines used by the
City; it was then set up as an internal service fund. As shown in Table 2,
all acquisition was accomplished by leasing. While the leases in this
department were "more economical" than those in the other proprietary
departments, over 60% of the leases had implicit interest rates in excess
of 15%. All these machines were acquired on a monthly lease basis, with
prices fixed by a two-year supply agreement negotiated with suppliers.
This administrator mentioned the risk, of obsolescence as the major factor
he considered in making acquisition decisions, but gave no indication of
having tried to determine optimal usage periods that might have, at least,
resulted in longer-terra leases. This director had previously been respon-
sible for public relations in the governmental department, and he indicated
that this is still his primary responsibility, noting that his performance
evaluation would not have "anything to do with money." Thus, his training
and experience were primarily governmental in nature.
The asset acquisition activities in the remaining proprietary funds
provide some support for the depreciation model. As illustrated in Table
2, the airport, vehicle and equipment services, and water and wastewater
departments have made material additions to property, plant and equipment
and, yet, did not lease. Fixed asset additions were smaller for the audi-
torium and coliseum, but this fund also had no leases. Lease avoidance in
proprietary departments using long-terra assets suggests weighing of long-
terra costs in acquisition decisions consistent with the depreciation model.
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Lease Analysis for City B
Uneconomic Leases of Governmental Departments
Only one of the nine governmental departments in City B leased assets.
The present value of these leases, shown in Table 3, is $226,663, resulting
in an excess cost of leasing of $57,228. The total expenditures of the
general fund for 1979-80 were $11,597,676, and the excess cost of leasing
is 0.49% of these expenditures. It is 0.51% of total tax revenues
($11,153,665) and 1.82% of property tax revenues ($3,142,219) . The implicit
interest rates for the items being leased ranged from 18.25% to 22.58%,
considerably higher than the City's hypothetical borrowing rates.
Insert Table 3 here
Table 3 compares capital outlay to total departmental expenditures, and
it indicates the nonleasing departments also had small percentages of capi-
tal outlay. Comparing the excess cost of leasing to these capital expen-
ditures, the excess cost takes on more significance, it is 174% of 1979-80
governmental departmental capital outlay. This result appears to provide
some support for the expenditure model.
Proprietary vs. Governmental Departments
The summary of asset acquisition activities for City B's proprietary
departments is presented in Table 4. None of these departments had leased
fixed assets when the purchase option was available. Special grant
restrictions tend to provide additional incentive to purchase in the mass
transit department. These restrictions were discussed in connection with
City A. In terras of the research question, the water department is probably
the most significant of these departments because it had large additions to
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property, plant, and equipment , 'without the grant incentives. This absence
of leases is consistent with the depreciation model.
Insert Table 4 here
Attitudes toward Leasing in City B
Interviews with City B department administrators indicated a general
reluctance to use leases. This was the smallest of the three cities
studied, and directors of departments appeared to rely heavily on the
Budget Committee members for planning their asset acquisitions. This
committee includes the director of a proprietary fund, Central Services,
who stated that leasing is "living beyond your means;" the director of
finance, whose prior experience was five years in finance and accounting in
industry; and the City Manager, who is exposed to both expenditure and
depreciation accounting. While the City Manager indicated that directors
had considerable autonomy in running their departments, several mentioned
that they felt he would not approve of leasing and that they would want his
approval before engaging in a lease. If these individuals were strongly
influencing leasing decisions, their influence is consistent with their
training and with the accounting information they receive. This type of
decision effect suggests how the expenditure model might be overcome by
introduction of other factors.
Lease Analysis for City C
Uneconomic Leases of Governmental Departments
Eleven of the fourteen governmental departments (79%) in City C have
engaged in 28 leases with a present value of $892,075, and an excess cost
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of $87,849. These are summarized by department in Table 5, along with »
total expenditure and capital expenditure data. City C's Information
Systems department also leased a computer that was not included in the ana-
lysis because of the inability to obtain purchase information. The excess
cost is 0.23% of general fund expenditures for 1979-80 ($38,815,676).
Comparing excess cost to total tax revenues ($32,031,240) and property tax
revenues ($23,506,428), the excess cost is 0.27% of the first and 0.37% of
the second.
Insert Table 5 here
Only three departments appear to be leasing no assets: management and
budget, public transportation, and recreation. Each of the departments had
capital outlay of less than 0.5% of total expenditures for 1979-80. Thus,
the governmental departments of interest all appear to be involved in
leasing.
Of particular interest in City C were two economic lease-purchase
contracts of the fire department. This department acquired two pumpers
with an implicit rate of 7.04% while the estimated borrowing rate of the
City was 8.32% at that time. This finding is not inconsistent with the
hypothesized expenditure model; it illustrates that some types of leasing
can satisfy the goal of reducing annual expenditures and long-run costs at
the same time. The lack of long-run cost data may, however, fail to
suggest investigation of this option to an administrator. Except for this
lease, the relevant governmental departments were engaging in uneconomic
leases, providing some support for the expenditure model.
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Proprletary vs. Governmental Departments
Table 6 shows the excess leasing costs in the proprietary departments
of City C was $7,047. The total dollar value of the excess cost of leasing
in governmental departments of City C, $87,849, is much greater than that
in the proprietary departments; but, as a percentage of the purchase cost
(10.92% for governmental funds and 70.51% for proprietary funds), the
proprietary department lease displays the greater excess cost. The average
excess cost of $3137 for governmental funds is also less than $7047.
Insert Table 6 here
The excess cost of leasing in the proprietary funds is actually the
result of only one copier leased by the airport authority. This excess
cost is .21% of total expenses ($3,305,846) of the airport authority and
.67% of the additions to property, plant and equipment. The materiality
of this lease, compared to other items, may be questionable, but it also
suggests the possibility of other factors considered in the lease/purchase
decision process. These are discussed in the following section.
The remaining proprietary departments in City C (civic center and fleet
management) had no leases. In interviews with these directors, and with
the airport director as well, all indicated a concern with long-run costs
in making asset acquisition decisions. Thus, proprietary asset acquisition
activity seemed to be fairly consistent with the hypothesized depreciation
model.
Additional Evidence: Administrators Perceptions
of Acquisition Decisions
Interviews of the department administrators in the three cities pro-
vided some additional support for the different models of asset acquisition
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decisions. Administrators were asked to name the factors they considered
in making their lease-purchase decisions. An extensive discussion of the
2
responses is beyond the scope of this paper, but a contrast of two factors
is of particular relevance to this discussion.
Two commonly mentioned decision factors were annual budget constraints
(expenditure emphasis) and some measure of total cost, including lifetime
dollar outlay, net present value, and implicit interest rate (expense
emphasis). Governmental and proprietary administrators mentioned these
factors in reverse order of frequency. Annual budget constraints were men-
tioned by 76% of governmental administrators, but by only 46% of proprietary
administrators. On the other hand, total costs were stressed by 85% of
proprietary administrators, compared to 55% of governmental administrators.
Thus, the administrators' own evaluations were consistent with the expendi-
ture model's short-terra governmental department decisions and the deprecia-
tion model's long-term proprietary department decisions.
Extensions of the Models
While the major emphasis of this study was the present value analysis
of the leases of each city, other factors of interest emerged in the analy-
ses and the interviews. In particular, the leased assets were predomi-
nantly limited to certain kinds of assets. While these findings will not
be discussed at length in this paper, they are mentioned briefly to suggest
possible extensions of the models and further related investigation.
All three cities were involved in leases of computers and computer
equipment. Cities A and C were also leasing most of their copy machines
and several typewriters and word processors. These three types of assets
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represent a majority of the leases analyzed, and they have two charac-
teristics in common that should probably be taken into account in deve-
loping an expanded model of asset acquisition decisions. First, these
assets are perceived to be subject to more rapid technological change than
many assets. Second, computer and copy equipment vendors do an extensive
amount of their business through leasing. They probably, therefore,
suggest leasing to prospective customers more often than do many other ven-
dors, and many leasing options are readily available.
Twelve (45%) of City C's leases were for vehicles and heavy equip-
ment (cars, vans, fire engines, and bulldozers) acquired by governmental
departments, indicating that these types of assets are also available
through short-term lease or lease-purchase arrangements.
Finally, as discussed earlier, hospital equipment was leased in City A,
and this may have been due to special cost reimbursement restrictions by
third parties and by technological change considerations.
The findings above suggest that a refinement of the asset acquisition
models developed earlier might include a ranking of leasing alternatives
based upon factors such as risk of technological change, marketing of
leasing options, and cost reimbursement restrictions.
Conclusion
The preceding analysis of leases has provided evidence of uneconomic
asset acquisition in three cities. Based upon this analysis and interviews
with department administrators, most governmental administrators appeared
to be making decisions consistent with a governmental administrative deci-
sion model that focuses primarily on controlling expenditures. Most excep-
tions to the model appeared to be due to the introduction of additional
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decision cues such as the involvement of other personnel with training in
long-term cost measurement, grant and third-party restrictions, or
administrators' experience employing expense accounting.
The comparison between governmental and proprietary departments' leasing
activities seems to provide support for an alternative model of proprietary
asset-acquisition decisions. Proprietary administrators indicated, by
their limited leasing (except in special circumstances) and by their state-
ments regarding these decisions, a tendency to emphasize long-run costs over
short-run expenditures. This was consistent with the "depreciation model"
of asset acquisition decisions developed at the beginning.
Based upon the theoretical development and the detailed evaluation of
these three cases, preliminary support for and additional investigation of
the following hypotheses seems warranted.
HI: Municipal departments that use expenditure accounting will
tend to acquire assets for long-term use with leases that
are uneconomic.
H2: Municipal departments that use depreciation expense accounting
will tend to acquire assets for long-term use with leases that
are more economic than the leases negotiated by departments
that use expenditure accounting.
If the preliminary theoretical development and findings hold true, they
imply a possible solution to the problem of uneconomic asset acquisition.
Expansion of municipal accounting and budgeting systems to include the
generation of long-term cost information would provide an additional cue
to municipal administrators for use in their asset acquisition decisions.
-26-
Awareness of the long-term cost differential might encourage an administra-
tor to investigate alternative means of financing or to defer acquisition
to another budget period; it should, at least, focus attention on various
long-term alternatives.
The alternative information system suggested in this study is the
accrual accounting system usually employed by proprietary departments and
by private enterprise. This should not be viewed as an exclusive solution,
for there are other types of accounting information that could direct
attention at long-term costs as well as alternative measurements of those
costs. Since governmental administrators must be concerned with annual
budgetary constraints, for legal reasons at the very least, a reasonable
solution might supplement budgetary accountability with information that
will focus on and encourage the minimization of long-run costs.
-27-
Footnotes
The manner in which these guidelines were established insures their
conservative nature. Senate Report 92-437, in discussing this revision to
the Internal Revenue Code, explains that guideline lives should reflect the
actual asset replacement practices of taxpayers in the 30th percentile. In
other words, for taxpayers surveyed, 29 percent of the assets had shorter
lives and 70 percent had longer lives than the guideline established. [pp.
584-585] . Choice of the 30th percentile further assures that any bias is
toward the conservative side.
2
These factors are examined at length in Factors Affecting the Asset
Acquisition Decisions of Municipalities," a forthcoming article by the
author in The Government Accountants Journal.
-28-
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FIGURE 1
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FIGURE 2
ASSET ACQUISITION MODEL: LONG TERM COST CONTEXT
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